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Housing Policy in the UK: the importance of spatial nuance  
 
Abstract 
The UK has been engaged in an ongoing process of constitutional reform since the late 1990s, 
when devolved administrations were established in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  
As devolution has evolved there has been a greater trend towards divergence in housing 
SROLF\ZKLFKFDOOVLQWRTXHVWLRQDQ\QRWLRQRIDµUK H[SHULHQFH¶:KLOVWWKH6FRWWLVK
independence referendum again returned constitutional reform high onto the political agenda, 
there still remain tensions between devolved governments and the UK government in 
Westminster, with England increasingly becoming the outlier in policy terms.  Informed by 
ideas of social constructionism, which emphasises the politics of housing, this paper draws on 
an analysis of policy narratives to highlight the need for greater geographical sensitivity.  
This requires not only more spatial nuance, but also a recognition that these differences are 
underpinned by divergent political narratives in different parts of the UK.  This emphasis on 
the politics underpinning policy has relevance internationally in other geographical contexts.   
 
Keywords: devolution, constitutional change, Scottish referendum, welfare reform, social 
constructionism   
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Introduction  
'HVSLWHPHGLDKHDGOLQHVDERXWµ8.+RXVLQJ3ROLF\¶see Guardian 2016, 2014; Financial 
Times 2016) housing policy has been a devolved matter since 1999.  Prior to the 
establishment of the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
separate laws and regulatory frameworks existed across the UK.  Consequently, this paper 
asserts there LVQRVXFKWKLQJDVDµUK H[SHULHQFH¶LQthe housing field, and advocates for 
PRUHµVSDWLDOO\-DZDUH¶SROLF\DQDO\VLV3Lnch 1997) that avoids conflating the English 
experience with that of the UK as a whole.  Building on past research about the devolved 
nature of public policy making (see for example, Paris et al 2003; Sim 2004; Pawson 2006; 
McKee and Phillips 2012; Muir 0DFOHQQDQDQG2¶6XOOLYDQ this paper seeks to 
update and advance our understanding of these issues by focusing on the period post 2010.  
As the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and subsequent calls for further UK 
constitutional reform highlight, devolution is not a one off event rather an ongoing, evolving 
process. These arguments have international reach given similar debates about sub-state 
nationalism and self-determination are occurring in other places such as Chile, Spain and 
Canada.  Moreover, by locating our arguments within a wider body of literature on social 
constructionism and interpretative governance (Jacobs et al 2004; Bevir and Rhodes 2006), 
we seek to draw attention to the politics of housing, adding to international debates within 
Housing Studies (Jacobs and Pawson 2015). 
 The structure of our paper is as follows.  The first section briefly traces the piece-meal, 
evolving nature of devolution in the UK and how this has influenced the shifting dynamic of 
power between governments and territories.  The second section draws attention to 
differences in policy narratives through a focus on the policy examples of social and 
affordable housing, and regulation of the private rented sector (PRS).  The third and final 
substantive VHFWLRQGUDZVRQWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VZHOIDUHUHIRUPDJHQGDWRKLJKOLJKW
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tensions in the devolved settlement, and the way in which divergent political narratives are an 
important consideration in any analysis of political devolution.  Through an emphasis on the 
different policy and political contexts across the UK we aim to develop a more complex and 
critical understanding of devolution as an ongoing process (Pollitt 2013). 
 
Devolution: a piece-meal and ongoing process 
The devolution of legislative powers across the UK was a defining moment of the Blair 
administration.  An integral DVSHFWRI1HZ/DERXU¶VPRGHUQLVation agenda (Newman 2001), 
it has left a long-ODVWLQJOHJDF\IXQGDPHQWDOO\DOWHULQJWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQDOODQGVcape of public 
SROLF\LQWKH8.¶0DF.LQQRQ  In general terms, devolution involves the transfer 
of political and/or legislative powers previously exercised by national parliaments to a 
subordinate, subnational elected body, often defined on a geographical basis (Bogdanor 
1999).   
Elected assemblies, and an associated set of devolved powers, were introduced to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998, following referenda in each case.  These new 
legislative bodies all sat for the first time in 1999.  Devolved powers include major areas of 
public policy such as housing, planning, education, health and regeneration in all four 
jurisdictions.  Reserved powers include most taxation, social security (except Northern 
Ireland1), defence, energy, immigration and constitutional matters (for fuller discussion see, 
Keating 2002; MacKinnon 2015).  This division of responsibilities reflected the functions 
that were already being exercised by the Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh Offices.  There 
was no µHTXLYDOHQWWUDGLWLRQ¶RIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHGHYROXWLRQLQ(QJODQGZKLFKLVZK\WKH8.
government assumed responsibility for English functions, and why there was no wider reform 
of the UK constitution (Jeffrey 2007: 93).   
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The form of devolution in each nation has therefore been varied from the outset, 
including the initial financial settlement and powers.2 It has continued to evolve differently 
depending on the political context and degree of public support: 
x Scotland: 74% voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament, with 64% also in favour of 
tax-raising powers (McGuinness 2012). Unlike with the other assemblies, power to 
introduce an increase in income tax was granted in 1998, but has never been used. 
Further tax powers were introduced in 2012, and a referendum on Scottish 
independence in 2014 resulted in 55% wishing to remain part of the UK.  The Smith 
Commission (2014), convened following the referendum, argued for the further 
devolution of powers, including changes to borrowing powers and to social security 
benefits: an issue returned to in section three.  The Scotland Act 2016, which recently 
gained royal assent, addressed some of these recommendations. 
x Wales: Just over 50% voted in favour of a Welsh Assembly in 1999 (McGuinness 
2012). The National Assembly for Wales was not given legislative responsibility, 
however it received a wide range of administrative powers as listed previously.  In 
2011 in a second referendum, 64% supported the introduction of law-making powers 
for the Welsh Assembly, now the Welsh Government.  Further proposals for 
devolution (HMSO 2015b) have been critiqued due to concerns over the funding to 
support the proposed new powers, and the difficulties of implementing a reserved 
powers model in Wales (Jones 2015). 
x Northern Ireland (NI): 71% voted in favour of devolution as part of a wider 
referendum on the Good Friday agreement in 1998 (McGuinness 2012).  Devolution 
was part of a peace settlement to try and bring the NI troubles to an end.  The 
structure proved initially unstable and the Assembly did not sit between 2002 and 
2007.   
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x England: it does not have its own devolved government; instead, the UK government 
in Westminster legislates for both English and UK policy.  Dissatisfaction with this 
constitutional arrangement has been long-standing, as captured by Dal\HOO¶V µ:HVW
/RWKLDQ¶TXHVWLRQ (Bogdanor 1999).  It has been further heightened since the Scottish 
referendum DVUHIOHFWHGLQFDOOVIRUµEnglish Vote for EngliVK/DZV¶(EVEL) (Jeffrey 
et al 2014), and a resurged interest in devolution for English cities.  This builds on the 
decentralisation to regional offices of government, creation of the London Mayor, and 
regional development agencies initiated under New Labour in the 1990s (Humphrey 
and Shaw 20040DFOHQQDQDQG2¶6XOOLYDQ).  1HZ/DERXU¶VSODQIRUHOHFWHG
regional assemblies was shelved after the first referendum in the North East in 2004 
indicated 78% were against the proposal (McGuinness 2012). 
Since 1999, devolution has continued to evolve, in part due to the µpiecemeal¶ and 
µuneven¶ processes by which it was introduced in the first instance (Jeffrey 2007: 100).  
Devolution is fundamentally a geographical process, involving the rescaling and remaking of 
governance, and thus the creation of new political geographies (Brenner 2004; MacKinnon 
2015) DQGµVWDWHVSDFHV¶ (Clifford and Morphet 2015a: 4).  7KLVOHQGVFUHGHQFHWR3HFN¶V
(2001: 449) argument that the state is best conceived not as a monolithic, static entity; rather 
as DµSURFHVVLQPRWLRQ¶.   
 UK devolution is asymmetrical with differences in powers, responsibilities and fiscal 
autonomy not only between the UK government and the devolved administrations, but also 
between the four nations.  As Jeffrey comments the UK is an increasingly µlopsided¶ state, in 
which England is the larger, more dominant partner demographically and economically, but 
also the only part to be governed centrally by the Westminster Parliament (2007: 95).  This 
uneven balance, in terms of the institutions of government, is further exacerbated by different 
UK political parties being in power in different tiers of government, for example the election 
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in 2015 of a Conservative government, and the election of an SNP government in Scotland in 
2011, and the involvement of parties without a UK-wide remit, especially in NI.  Processes of 
devolution therefore need to be situated and understood within the context of this wider and 
varied political environment.  As well as fundamental differences between political parties, 
the changing economic context and implementation of austerity measures also marks a shift 
in the wider political context between the early and latter periods of devolution (Danson et al 
2012; MacKinnon 2015).  This is where the literature on interpretive governance and social 
constructionism can be insightful (Jacobs et al 2004; Bevir and Rhodes 2006), providing an 
important theoretical backdrop to understanding tensions and constraints in the UK 
constitutional settlement; points that will be returned to in section three. 
 
Policy and Political Narratives across the UK 
Compared to other devolved states, the UK model can be regarded as hiJKO\µSHUPLVVLYH¶
(Jeffrey 2007: 103).  The, way in which the devolved administrations are funded through the 
block grant (devised through the Barnett formula) means their funding is not tied to 
delivering UK policy ambitions, although goals may of course be tempered by UK Treasury 
financial constraints and other policy areas reserved to Westminster, such as taxation and 
social security benefits.  These tensions in part explain why there is much continuity in 
housing (and wider social) policies across the UK.  This is more evident in some policy areas 
than others, as has been well documented in past research on devolution.  For example, long-
standing policies to promote homeownership through various types of shared equity and 
shared ownership initiatives, most recently Help to Buy (Wilcox et al 2015); housing stock 
WUDQVIHUDVDVROXWLRQWRµPRGHUQL]LQJ¶VRFLDOKRXVLQJXQGHUWKH%ODLUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQPawson  
et al 2010); DQGDQHPSKDVLVRQVRFLDOODQGORUGVSULPDULO\KRXVLQJDVVRFLDWLRQVµZLGHUUROH¶
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in supporting community development and regeneration in their communities, as embodied in 
µ%LJ6RFLHW\¶debates under the coalition (2010-15) government (McKee 2015b).   
In the period post-2010, it is in housing policies to support those on low incomes 
and/or in rental housing that breaks and fractures in the underpinning political narratives, and 
subsequent policies, become more evident.  This is reverberated in wider social policy, as 
evident in debates about welfare reform (Mooney and Scott 2011).  These areas of discord are 
more illuminating in understanding the underpinning politics as well as the social 
construction of particular policy narratives.  For this reason, we have concentrated our focus 
in this paper on social and affordable housing, including the Right to Buy policy, and 
regulation of the PRS.3   $ILQDOLPSRUWDQWSRLQWWRFRQVLGHULV0DF.LQQRQ¶V (2015) call to 
also think about divergence within as well as between nations.  Whilst space constrains the 
extent to which we can explore this, we nonetheless endorse his argument to also think 
temporally about policy shifts within a territory.  This argument is particularly pertinent in 
the English context.  Recent proposals to support further devolution to English cities through 
Growth Deals and City Deals, and the proposed creation of Mayors outside of London are 
good examples of this desire for greater autonomy and policy differentiation within a country. 
 In the remainder of this section, we focus on two areas of housing policy: social and 
affordable housing, including the Right to Buy, and regulation of the PRS.  We argue that in 
the latter phase of devolution since 2010 England has increasingly become the outlier in 
policy terms with clear political differences emerging between UK and devolved 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKHVWRKRXVLQJIRUORZ-income and vulnerable groups.  This reflects 
vastly different interpretations of the causes and solutions to poverty and inequality, as well 
as the appropriate role and size of the state (McKee 2015a).  For example, whilst 
Conservative governments have been informed by individualistic explanations (e.g. 
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behavioural arguments), devolved governments have drawn influence from more structuralist 
accounts (e.g. unemployment, welfare reform).    
 As Table 1 highlights, the housing tenure structure varies geographically with social 
housing being a larger sector in Scotland than elsewhere in the UK.  Whilst devolved 
governments retain a positive commitment to social housing (Scottish Government 2010, 
2011; Welsh Assembly Government 2010; Department for Social Development 2012), 
recognising its vital role as a welfare safety-net and a vehicle to achieve policy commitments 
on affordable housing, in England the sector has come under attack by a Conservative 
government that has problematised it as a cause of poverty (Jacobs and Manzi 2013; 
Hodkinson and Robbins 2014).  The Localism Act 2011 effectively ended security of tenure 
IRUVRFLDOKRXVLQJWHQDQWVLQ(QJODQGWKURXJKLQWURGXFLQJVKRUWHUµIOH[LEOHWHQDQFLHV¶
(typically for two to five years)DQGLQWURGXFLQJKLJKHUµDIIRUGDEOHUHQWV¶ZKLFKDUHPRUH
aligned to local market rents. This is in contrast to continued security of tenure and below-
market subsidised rents elsewhere in the UK.  In Scotland local authorities continue to 
receive subsidy to build council housing with many engaging in small annual programmes, in 
addition to new developments by housing associations. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Whilst devolved governments continue to invest significantly in social housing, the 
SROLF\UKHWRULFLQ(QJODQGKDVVKLIWHGPXFKPRUHH[SOLFLWO\WRµDIIRUGDEOHKRXVLQJ¶ZLWh a 
greater emphasis on subsidising home-ownership, particularly for first-time-buyers.  Social 
housing by contrast has been denigrated and marginalised in England.  In his closing speech 
of the 2015 Conservative Party conference the Prime Minister advocated relaxing planning 
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laws that require developers to build social housing as part of a mixed-tenure private 
developments, so that more homes for sale can be built, and public investment shifted 
towards home buying (Independent 2015; HMSO 2016).  Whilst policies to promote 
homeownership (such as Help to Buy) exist across the UK, a dual approach that recognises 
the importance of social housing predominates outwith England, with affordable housing 
imagined more broadly as comprising (social) homes for rent as well as homes for sale:   
We are committed to a flexible, efficient and responsive housing system that helps 
people to meet their housing needs.  Nearly 1 in 3 households rent their home from a 
local authority, a housing association or a private landlord.  We want people to be 
able to move between different types of housing - renting social housing, renting from 
a private landlord, and buying a home - as needs and situations change (Welsh 
Government 2014, no page number).   
 
[the Housing Strategy] is an inclusive vision that seeks to address housing need across 
all tenures and to play a role in helping support and sustain economic recovery, create 
employment and regenerate some of our most deprived and neglected communities 
[«] we must ensure that good quality housing is available, in every tenure, which is 
affordable, accessible and sustainable (Department for Social Development 2012: 3). 
 
This is not the case in England, of which the recent Housing and Planning Bill 2015-
16 is a good example.  It continues the measures introduced by the Localism Act relating to 
security of tenure, with new English secure tenancies to be µIRUDIL[HGWHUPRIbetween 2 and 
5 years¶(HMSO 2016: 50), thus further undermining WHQDQW¶VDELOLW\WRPDNHDµKRPHIRU
OLIH¶.  7KH%LOODOVRSURSRVHVKLJKHUUHQWVIRUKLJKHULQFRPHWHQDQWV7KLVµSD\WRVWD\¶
provision, which aims to restrict social housing to those on the lowest income (2016: 28), 
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imagines social housing as a welfare safety-net for those on the lowest incomes.  These 
measures move English social housing policy in a fundamentally different direction to the 
rest of the UK, continuing the problematisation and denigration of social housing (Hancock 
and Mooney 2013; Jacobs and Manzi 2013).  Affordable housing for sale is the UK 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VPDLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHµKRXVLQJFULVLV¶LQ(QJODQGAs outlined in the 
aforementioned Bill a relaxation of planning obligations to build social housing in new 
developments, coupled with the vigorous promotion of the Help to Buy scheme which 
reduces the deposit requirement of prospective homeowners, are to be the main policy 
vehicles by which this has been achieved.  The political and policy rhetoric in England is 
therefore very much geared towards homeownership, assuming this is the tenure everyone 
µDVSLUHV¶ too.  This approach reflects the Conservative Part\¶VSRVLWLRQLQJRILWVHOIDVWKH
µSDUW\RIKRPHRZQHUVKLS¶(Conservative Party 2015: 53-54; see also, HMSO 2016).   
To achieve this goal the UK Government are to extend the Right to Buy in England: a 
long-standing policy which enables sitting council tenants to buy their home at heavily 
discounted rates, to housing association tenants.  Introduced in the 1980s the Right to Buy 
was a significant driver for the growth of homeownership in the UK, especially amongst 
lower-income groups.  It has been critiqued for leading to the residualisation and denigration 
RIVRFLDOKRXVLQJDVDµWHQXUHRIODVWUHVRUW¶)RUUHVWDQG0XULH7KHVH news plans 
provoked a split in the housing association movement in England with the National Housing 
Federation offering a voluntary deal to the government, with the proviso any affordable 
homes lost would be replaced (HMSO 2015a).  However these associations are to be 
compensated by the sale of high-value local authority stock.  This policy reflects not simply a 
desire to maximise homeownership, but also to reduce the total level of social housing stock.  
This is distinct to affordable housing agendas elsewhere in the UK. 
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Whilst housing association tenants in the devolved nations already have the Right to 
Buy the specific rules vary, with funding also arranged differently to the English proposals.  
Moreover, in Scotland it has now been abolished by the Housing (Scotland) Act 2014.  From 
August 2016 social housing tenants will no longer have the right to buy their home.  This 
different approach reflects a recognition of the positive value of social housing in Scotland, 
and the importance of retaining affordable homes for rent in order to meet broader policy 
goals in relation to creating a more equal Scottish society (Scottish Government 2015b).  
Right to Buy discounts were already restricted prior to this via the Housing (Scotland) Act 
2001, which sought to balance the competing interests of current and future tenants.  There 
are also plans to abolish the Right to Buy in Wales (Welsh Government 2015).  Northern 
Ireland has reduced discounts in recent years but also extended its House Sales Scheme to 
housing association tenants in 2003. There are no plans to abolish the Right to Buy. 
 The final example we will explore is in relation to the regulation of the PRS.  The 
sector has doubled in size over the last fifteen years, with the growth more pronounced in 
England where it has overtaken social housing as the largest rental sector (see Table 1).  It 
has also become the second largest tenure in Northern Ireland.  Traditionally associated with 
students and mobile young professionals the PRS is now much more diverse, housing 
growing numbers of young adults, families with children, and low-income households.  This 
shift reflects difficulties in accessing both social housing and homeownership, as well as 
broader patterns of austerity which have impacted negatively on incomes and wage levels 
(McKee et al 2015). 
 In October 2015 the Scottish Government published the Private Housing (Tenancies) 
Bill, which became an Act in March 2016.  It seeks to modernise the PRS via the following 
proposals: 
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x Streamlined, model tenancy agreements which are easier to understand and contain 
modernised grounds for repossession, with notice periods linked to length of tenancy;  
x (QGLQJRIWKHµQRIDXOW¶JURXQGVIRUSRVVHVVLRQ;  
x 5HQWLQFUHDVHVOLPLWHGWRRQHSHU\HDUZLWKWKUHHPRQWKV¶QRWLFHZLWKORFDODXWKRULWLHV
having scope to implement rent controls in areas where there is concern;  
x More progressive repossession grounds for rent arrears; 
7KHVHUHIRUPVUHIOHFWFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHLQDELOLW\RISHRSOHWRPDNHDµKRPH¶LQWKH356
and the impact this in turn has on their well-being (Shelter Commission on Housing and 
Wellbeing 2015).  It has been paralleled by political commitments to boost supply in both the 
private homeownership sector and social housing.   
 Northern Ireland and Wales have also sought to reform the PRS through the Housing 
(Wales) Act 2014 and the Landlord Registration Scheme Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
2014.  These Acts require landlords to be registered and licensed with their details held on a 
central database; it also affords local authorities enforcement powers to ensure compliance 
with these requirements.  It mirrors the landlord registration scheme that has been in 
operation in Scotland since 2013, introduced by the Private Rented Housing (Scotland) Act 
2011.  In Northern Ireland, the Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMO) Act 2016  makes 
comprehensive provision for better conditions in HMOs, including an HMO licensing system 
in line with the rest of the UK, to replace the current failing landlord registration scheme.  By 
contrast there is no appetite for even this level of centralised state regulation in England; 
instead it is left to local authority discretion to create and implement registration schemes 
resulting in considerable divergence.  Not least as local government budget pressures mean 
there is little resource for enforcement action.   Consequently, PRS tenants in England are 
much more vulnerable to landlords unwilling or unable to fulfil their responsibilities.  This 
political faith of the UK government in market-based solutions to the housing crisis, coupled 
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with reforms to the Housing Benefit system which limit the amount of financial support 
households can receive, has resulted in low-income households being displaced from 
neighbourhoods where rents are more expensive (Hamnett 2010, 2014).   
 What these two policy examples highlight is that whilst the Celtic nations increasingly 
draw lessons from each other, England is increasingly out of sync with policy debates 
elsewhere in the UK.  Differences in the political leanings of the UK and devolved 
administrations is a key factor, for they have fundamentally opposing views on the causes 
and solutions to poverty, and the role of the state in mitigating inequality.4  This not only 
leads to policy differentiation, but also tensions in the devolved settlement as the next section 
explores.   
 
Tensions in the Devolved Settlement  
3ROLF\GHYHORSPHQWDFURVVWKH8.LVµKHDYLO\GHSHQGHQWRQDQGFORVHO\LQWHUUHODWHGZLWKWKH
G\QDPLFVRIGHYROXWLRQ¶0RRQH\DQG6FRWW6).  Whilst most commenters distinguish 
between devolved and reserved powers (see section one), Gibb (2015: 29) argues that 
housing policy is best understood as a µK\EULG¶RIWKHWZRThis is because key housing 
policy levers and social security provisions continue to be reserved to the UK government in 
Westminster (with the exception of Northern Ireland, as previously discussed).  Whilst in 
other devolved or federal states (e.g. Belgium, Canada and the USA) national and sub-
national tiers of government have more shared responsibility for raising and distributing 
fiscal revenue, in the UK context the level of funding allocated to devolved administrations 
stems from decisions made at Westminster.  As Jeffrey (2007: 101) highlights this creates 
µVSLOORYHUHIIHFWV¶ZLWKWKHHIIHFWVRIGHFLVLRQVWDNHQLQLondon passed on to the other 
nations.  The devolved governments therefore have to manage the fall-out from the UK 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSDUWLFXODUpolitical) approach to managing the fiscal deficit that emerged after 
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the global economic crisis of 2008.  This creates tensions when devolved administrations, and 
their electorates, adopt a different position on public spending and priorities. 
 Housing Benefit (HB) is a strong policy example of these inherent (political) tensions 
within the devolution settlement.  It is a social security benefit designed to help low-income 
households meet their rental costs (in both social and private rental housing).  Given the shift 
from supply to demand side housing subsidies DQGWKHµGHPXQLFLSDOLVDWLRQ¶RIFRXQFLO
housing since the 1980s, HB occupies a pivotal role in housing policy.  Yet it remains a 
reserved power of the UK government, again with the exception of Northern Ireland.  A large 
component of welfare spending, it has become a target for reform under both UK Coalition 
and Conservative governments since 2010 (Jacobs and Manzi 2013; Beatty et al 2014; Powell 
2015).  The deep nature of these cuts, and their disproportionate impact upon low income 
groups has exacerbated pre-existing tensions between the UK and devolved administrations.   
The reforms introduced multiple changes in HB SURYLVLRQVWKHµEHGURRPWD[¶ZKLFK
reduced claimants payment if they were deemed to have more bedrooms than they needed; a 
raising of the age limit for the Shared Accommodation Rate from 25 to 35, which means 
young people will only receive help with their rent for costs equivalent to living in shared 
HMO accommodation; and a reduction of the level of Local Housing Allowance for PRS 
tenants, which introduces a cap on the maximum payment that can be received in line with 
rents in the bottom 30 per cent within the local area.  Combined these measures mean 
households are increasingly having to meet the gap between their actual rent and their HB 
payment.  Moreover, HB is set to become part of the new Universal Credit, which will 
amalgamate all social security payments into one monthly payment, with a maximum 
monthly cap regardless of where people live (an important factor given geographical 
differences in rental costs).  It has still to be fully rolled out across the UK, although it has 
been piloted in specific areas.   
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 The 6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHto HB reforms was to use Discretionary Housing 
Payments (DHPs) WRPLWLJDWHWKHZRUVWLPSDFWVRIWKHµ%HGURRP7D[¶, and indeed, the SNP 
pre-referendum promised to abolish the controversial policy in an independent Scotland.  HB 
was also a key focus of the Smith Commission (2014), although arguably the 
recommendations did not deliver the degree of control some political parties and civic 
organizations would have liked (for good summary, see Gibb 2015).  By contrast the Welsh 
Government has come under critique from its national assembly for not following the 
Scottish model of using DHPs; it chose instead to focus on the construction of smaller 
properties and investing in advice provision (National Assembly for Wales Public Accounts 
Committee 2015).  In Northern Ireland, agreement between the five Executive coalition 
SDUWLHVRQWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH¶VZHOIDUHUHIRUPDJHQGDhas proved impossible over several years, 
delaying the introduction of equivalent legislation to the Welfare Reform Act 2012.  Welfare 
rHIRUPZDVRQHRIVHYHUDOLVVXHVDGGUHVVHGLQWKHUHFHQWµ)UHVK6WDUW$JUHHPHQW¶%RZHUVHW
al 2015).  The matter was resolved through the NI Assembly agreeing to pass responsibility 
for legislation back to Westminster in late 2015. The NI Executive then commissioned an 
academic to recommend a package of mitigating features for the next four years, which 
LQFOXGHGQRXVHRIWKHµEHGURRP¶WD[VSDUHURRPVXEVLG\DQGDFRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKHFXUUHQW
option of HB payments made directly to the landlord (Evason 2016). 
 As the example of HB illuminates, tensions between different tiers of governance are 
as much about political differences, as they are about institutional and legal arrangements.  
This is underlined only too clearly in the divergent narratives and discourses underpinning 
welfare reform agendas.   
 
 
 
16 
 
Conclusion   
The 8.LVQRWDXQLWDU\VWDWHUDWKHUDµIDPLO\RIQDWLRQV¶Sturgeon, cited in Clifford and 
Morphet 2015b: 58).  It is therefore vital to avoid conflating the English experience with that 
of the UK.  Instead a more spatially nuanced policy analysis that recognises discontinuity as 
well as continuity, within and between territories is needed.  +RXVLQJKDVEHHQDµSURPLQHQW
SDUWRIWKHGHYROXWLRQVWRU\¶DQGDVLWHRIPXFKµSROLF\LQQRYDWLRQ¶LQWKH8.FRQWH[W*LEE
2015: 39).  In this latter period of devolution from 2010 onwards England has increasingly 
become the outlier, diverging significantly in housing policy terms from the rest of the UK.   
As such, it is unhelpful and misleading tRWDONDERXWµ8.KRXVLQJSROLF\¶  Not least as the 
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, subsequent debates about EVEL and the 
impending EU referendum continue to pose further questions about the future of the union, 
with the issue of separation never disappearing entirely from political debates. 
 Furthermore, this paper aims to highlight the emergence of µnew state spaces¶ 
following the re-territorialisation of policy that occurred after the devolved administrations 
were established in 1998.  This re-scaling of public policy making is fundamentally 
geographical, and demands a more spatially nuanced understanding of the evolving process 
of devolution.  This can only be achieved, we argue, by situating housing policy within the 
wider political context and the shifting nature of party politics in the UK.  Tensions between 
different tiers of government go beyond institutional and legal arrangements; they reflect 
fundamental political understandings of inequality and the role of the state in mitigating this.  
This has increased in the latter phase of devolution from 2010 onwards as tensions have been 
exacerbated, in part, due to these aforementioned political differences.  Our argument seeks 
to connect an emphasis on policy context and political differences with the changing role of 
the British state.  In doing so however, we look to interpretive understandings of governance 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2006), which draw attention to the underpinning narratives, political 
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projects and social constructed nature of policy.  This paper therefore connects to the 
longstanding body of work in Housing Studies influenced by social constructionist 
perspectives (see for example, Jacobs et al 2004). 
7RFRQFOXGHWKHUHLVQRVXFKWKLQJDVWKHµUK H[SHULHQFH¶LQcontemporary housing 
policy, if indeed there ever was.  This has been evidenced with reference to examples from 
social and affordable housing, and regulation of the PRS.  The policy discussions within this 
paper have further resonance beyond the UK, not least as devolution is an international 
phenomenon and critical aspect of contemporary governance.   This paper seeks to add to 
these broader debates through an updated, and critically informed exploration of the UK 
context.  In doing so, we seek to contribute to recent international debates within Housing 
Studies about the importance of engaging with the politics of housing (see Special Issue 
edited by Jacobs and Pawson 2015).   
 
Endnotes 
1. 1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶VµSDULW\¶DJUHHPHQWRQVRFLDOVHFXULW\LVWKDWWKH$VVHPEO\¶VSRZHU
to legislate will be used to deliver the same system (including benefit rates) in 
recognition of the common personal taxation provisions that exist across the UK. Any 
additional costs of an enhanced system (for example the measures agreed in 2016) 
must be met from the block grant (Bowers et al 2015). 
2. 6FRWODQG¶VUHVHUYHGSRZHUVDUHVHWRXWLQOHJLVODWLRQDQGDOORWKHUSRZHUVDUHDVVXPHG
to be devolved; Northern Ireland has both reserved and excepted powers in legislation, 
the latter being where laws are usually made at Westminster but can be made by the 
NI Assembly with the consent of the Secretary of State; Wales has a list of devolved 
SRZHUVNQRZQDVµ$VVHPEO\$FW¶SURYLVLRQVDQGDOORWKHUSRZHUVDUHDVVXPHGWREH
reserved (see, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-
18 
 
and-northern-ireland). In all cases Westminster may legislate on devolved matters 
with the consent of the relevant devolved body, as has happened recently with 
1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶V:HOIDUH5HIRUP%LOO 
3. Whilst homelessness is another field marked by significant divergence in the UK 
context, these differences are long-standing and have been well documented 
elsewhere and so are not covered here (see for example Anderson 2004; Fitzpatrick 
2004; Pawson and Davidson 2008; Wilcox and Fitzpatrick 2010; Mackie 2015).   
4. Whilst the ODQJXDJHRIµIDLUQHVV¶KDVEHHQXVHGLQWKH6FRWWLVKFRQWH[WWRHPSKDVLVH
the desire for a more equal Scottish society and the need for state intervention to 
deliver this, in England the very same language has been mobilised against low-
income groups to justify the introduction of welfare reform to tackle perceived 
µZHOIDUHVFURXQJHUV¶ZKRDUHRIWHQFRXQWHU-SRVHGZLWKµKDUG-ZRUNLQJIDPLOLHV¶
These differences reflect fundamentally different understandings of the causes and 
solutions to poverty, and the role of state intervention (see, Mooney and Scott 2011). 
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Table 1: Tenure ± UK by Country (% of People) 
 England Northern 
Ireland 
Scotland Wales UK 
Owner-Occupiers 64.8 71.9 65.6 68.8 65.3 
Social Renters 16.5 12.3 21.5 15.5 16.7 
Private Renters 16.9  14.1 11.9 14.2 16.3 
Other 1.8 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.8 
Source: 2011 UK Census 
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